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WHAT DO BUDGEf DEFICITS DO?
ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the effects of budget deficits on the economy in four steps. First,
it reviews standard theory abouthow budget deficits influencesaving, investment, the trade
balance. interest rates, exchange rates, and long-term growth. Second, it offers a rough estimate
of the magnitude of some of the effects. Third, it discusses how budget deficits affect economic
welfare. Finally, it considers the possibility that continuing budget deficits in a country could
lead to a hard landing" in which the demand for the country's assets suddenly collapses.
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and NEERNo issue in economic policy has generated moredebate over the
past decade than the effectsof government budget deficits.
Politicians of various ideologies argue thatdeficit reduction is
critical to the future of the UnitedStates and other major
economies. Although the economics professionis more divided over
the issue, many economists share theview that deficits are
haruful, and perhaps even disastrous.
When economists and policymakers decrydeficits, they cite
diverse reasons.Thus, despite almost unanimous concern over
deficits, there is considerable controversyabout what effects
deficits have on the economy. The goal ofthis paper is to clarify
these effects. Do budget deficits reduce economic growth?
Threaten to create a financial crisis? Dodeficits create winners
as well as losers? If so, who are they?How large are the effects
of deficits? Are deficits merely an chronicnuisance, or do they
threaten us with economic decay and, to use BenjaminFriedman's
(1988) ominous language, an upcoming "dayof reckoning?"
To answer these questions, we proceedin several steps.
Section I presents a positive analysis of theeffects of budget
deficits on aggregate economic variables such as GDP,exchange
rates, and real wages.The analysis follows the conventional
wisdom as captured, for example, in most undergraduatetextbooks.
In our view, the conventional wisdom inthis area is mostly On the
right track.
After describing the qualitative effects ofdeficits, we take
1a stab in Section II at quantifying the effects of recent deficits
in the United States.As usual in economics, theory is too
stylized to give precise estimates of the sizes of the effects.
But some simple calculations shed light on the orders of magnitude
involved.
Section III turns from positive analysis to a consideration of
deficits and economic well—being. Our theme here is that deficits
cause redistributions: some people lose from deficits, but others
gain. It is possible to justify the common view that deficits are
undesirable over all, but doing so is not aseasy as one might
think.
section IV turns from the question of what deficitscurrently
do to what they might do in the future.We focus on the
possibility that continued high deficits in a country will trigger
a "hard landing" in which the demand for domestic assets collapses.
Both the likelihood of such an event and its effects arehighly
uncertain.But the risx of a hard landing may be the most
compelling reason for reducing budget deficits.
I. Budget Deficits and the Economy
Suppose two countries are identical and initially both have
balanced budgets. Suddenly, for no good reason, onecountry starts
running a budget deficit, either by raising government spending or
by cutting taxes, while the other country keeps its budget
balanced. How will the evolution of these two economies differ?
In particular, howwillbudget deficits affect major economic
2variables, such as GDP, investment, net exports, wages, interest
rates, and exchangerates?
The Immediate Effects of Budget Deficits
Budget deficits have many effects. But they allfollow from
a single initial effect: deficits reducenational saving. National
saving is the sun of private saving (the after—taxincome that
households save rather than consume) and public saving (thetax
revenuethat the government saves rather than spends). When the
government runs a budget deficit, public savingis negative, which
reduces national saving below private saving.
The effect of a budget deficit on national saving is most
likelyless than one—for—one, for a decrease in public saving
produces a partially.-offsetting increase in privatesaving. For
example, consider a one—dollar tax cut.This tax cut reduces
public saving by one dollar, but it also raiseshouseholds' after—
tax income by one dollar. It is likely that households spendpart
of this windfall but save part as well. This implies thatnational
saving falls, but by less than the fall in publicsaving.'
How does lower national saving affect the economy? The answer
can be seen most easily by considering somesimple (and
irrefutable)accounting identities.Letting Y denot gross
Economists of the "Ricardian" school argue that consumers
save 100percent of a debt—financed tax cut, which impliesthat
deficits have no effect on national saving. Like mosteconomists.
we believe theaddedprivate saving is muchsmaller than the full
taxcut. For descriptions and critiques of the Ricardian position,
see Bernheim (1987) and Granlich (1989).
3domestic product, T taxes, C consumption, and G government
purchases, then private saving is Y—T-C, and public saving is T-G.
Adding these yields national saving, 8:
SY —C-G.
National saving is current income not used immediately to finance
consumption by households or purchases by the government.
The second crucifl accounting identity is the one that divides
GD? into four types of spending:
Y =C+I+ C + NX.
OutputI is the sumof consumption C, investment I, government
purchases C, and net exports mc. substituting this expression for
I into the previous equation f or national saving yields
S =I+MX.
Thissimple equation sheds considerable light on the effectsof
budgetdeficits. It says that national saving equals the sum of
investment and net exports. When budget deficits reduce national
saving, they must reduce investment, reduce net exports, or both.
The total fall in investment and net exports must exactly match the
fall in national saving.
To the extent that budget deficits increase the trade deficit
(that is, reducenet exports), another effect follows immediately:
budgetdeficits create a flow of assets abroad. This fact follows
from the equality of the current account and the capital account.
When a country imports more than it exports, it does not receive
theseextra goods and services for free; instead, it gives up
assets in return.Initially, these assets may be thelocal
4currency, but foreigners quickly use this money to buy corporate or
government bonds, equity, or real estate.In any case, when a
budget deficit turns a country into a net importer of goods and
services, the country also becomes a net exporter of assets.
At first, some of these conclusions may appear mysterious.
Business firms choose the economy's level of investment, and
domestic and foreign consumers choose net exports. These decisions
may seem independent of the political decisions that determine the
budget deficit. If the government decides to run a deficit, what
forces induce fins -toinvest less and foreigners to buy fewer
domestic products?
The answer is that these changes are brought about by interest
rates and exchange rates.Interest rates are determined in the
market for loans, where savers lend money to households and fins
who desire funds to invest. A decline in national saving reduces
the supply of loans available to private borrowers, which pushes up
the interest rate (the price of a loan).Faced with higher
interest rates, households and fins choose to reduce investment.
Higher interest rates also affect the flow of capital across
national boundaries. When domestic assets pay higher returns, they
are more attractive to investors both at home and abroad. The
increased demand fqr domestic assets affects the market for foreign
currency: if a foreigner wants to buy a domestic bond, he must
first acquire the domestic currency.Thus, a rise in interest
rates increases the demand forthedomestic currency in the market
for foreign exchange, causing the currency to appreciate.
5The appreciation of the currency, in turn, affects trade in
goods and services. With a stronger currency, domestic goods are
more expensive for foreigners, and foreign goods are cheaper for
domestic residents.Exports fall, imports rise, and the trade
balance moves toward deficit.2
To sum up: government budget deficits reduce national saving,
reduce investment, reduce net exports, and create a corresponding
flow of assets overseas. These effects occur because deficits also
raise interest rates and the value of the currency in the market
for foreign exchange.
-.
2 Atleast since the 1960s, most economists have agreed that
budget deficits create trade deficits by causing the domestic
currency to appreciate. Yet, within the past year journalists and
policyinakers have argued that budget deficits cause a deoreciation
of the currency.In particular, the fall in the dollar in the
first half of 1995 was widely blamed on low national savings
arising from U.S. deficits. A New York Tipes headline proclaimed
"Save the Dollar: Encourage Saving."
Can one make sense of this recent view? As far as we can see,
the only channel through which budget deficits could weaken the
domestic currency is increased fear of the "hard landing0 discussed
in Section IV. A sharp fall in investor confidence could cause a
fall in the demand for domestic assets, outweighing the direct
effect of deficits. We are doubtful, however, that this is the
right explanation for the recent fall in the dollar. Early 1995
was a period in which the likelihood of a hard landing mayhave
fallen due to increased interest in budget—balancing by both
political parties.
We suspect, therefore, that recent views about deficits and
the dollar are simply fallacious.Since budget deficits are
generally viewed as irresponsible policies, it is tempting to blame
them for any undesirable event, even in the absence of a logical
connection. Note that if budget deficits weaken the dollar, they
also reduce rather than increase the trade deficit, an unappealing
implication that is ignored in recent discussions.
6Budget Deficits in the United States
So far, our discussion of budget deficits has been
theoretical. Do the effects we have discussed occur in actual
experience? There is a large empiricalliterature that looks for
these effects, unfortunately, this work has neither refuted the
theories we have sketched nor convinced skeptics of their validity.
The main obstacle to convincing empirical workis the
identification problem. Countries do not run fiscal policies as
controlled experiments; instead, policies change overtime in
response to changing econonic circumstances.It is difficult to
sort out the effects of budget deficits from their causes.
Nonetheless, it is useful to examine the U.S. experience over
the past dozen years. Table 1 provides some summarystatistics.
While these data do not prove anything definitively, they showthat
the U.S. experience can be explained by conventionaltheories. The
figures also offer a sense of the magnitudesinvolved.
As the top line of Table 1 shows, beginning in the early
l980s,the U.S. government switched from a policy of (inflation—
adjusted) budget surpluses to budget deficits.Public saving fell
by 2.4 percent of GDP. Rather than rising as onemight expect,
private saving rates fell slightly, suggestingthat the increased
impatience exhibited in fiscal policy also infectedthe private
sector. National saving fell by about 2.9 percentage points.
So far, this fall in national saving has been associatedwith
a fall in domestic investment of only 0.8 percentagepoints. As a
result, the U.S. trade balance went from a small surplusto a large
7and persistent deficit, a fall of about 2.0 percent of GOP. These
trade deficits have, as is necessary, been financed by the sale of
domestic assets. In 1981. the U.S. stock of net foreign assets was
about 12.3 of GDP; in 1993 it was negative 8.8 percent.The
world's largest economy went from being a creditor in world
financial markets to being a debtor.
8Table 1
The U.S. Experience
Averages as a percent of GDP
1960—1981 1982—1994 change
Public saving 0.8 —1.6 —2.4
Private saving 16.1 15.7 —0.4
National saving 16.9 14.0 —2.9
Domestic Investment 16.5 15.7 —0.8
Net Exports 0.3 —1.7 —2.0
Note: All variables are gross nominal magnitudes as a percentage of
nominal GD?. Public and private saving have been adjusted for the
effects of inflation: only the real interest on the national debt
is counted as expenditure by the government and income tothe
private sector. Net exports here are measured as nationalsaving
less domestic investment; it thus includes the net incomefrom
domestically—owned factors of production used abroad.
source: U.S. Department of Commerce and authors'calculations.
9Long-Run Effects of Deficits: Output and Wealth
The effects described so farbeginas soon as the government
begins to run a budget deficit. Suppose, as is often the case,
that the government runs deficits forasustained period, building
up a stock of debt. In this case, the accumulated effects of the
deficits alter the economy's output and wealth.
In the long run, an economy's output is determined by its
productive capacity, which in turn is partly determined by its
stock of capital. When deficits reduce investment, the capital
stock grows more slowly than it otherwise would, Over a year or
two, this crowding out of investment has a negligible effect on the
capital stock. But if deficits continue for a decade or more, they
can substantially reduce the economy's capacity to produce goods
and services.
The flow of assets overseas has similar effects.When
foreigners increase their ownership of domestic bonds, real estate,
or equity, more of the income from production flows overseas in the
form of interest, rent, and profit. National income——the value of
production that accrues to residents of a nation——falls when
foreigners receive more of the return on domestic assets.
Recall that budget deficits, by reducing national saving, must
reduce either investment or net exports. As a result, they must
lead to some combination of a smaller capital stock and greater
foreign ownership of domestic assets. Although there is
controversy about which of these effects is larger, this issue is
not crucial for the impact on national income. If budget deficits
10crowd out capital, national income falls because less is produced;
if budget deficits lead to trade deficits, just as much is
produced, but less of the income from production accrues to
domestic residents.
In addition to affecting total income, deficits also alter
factor prices: wages (the return to labor) and profits (thereturn
to the owners of capital). According to thestandard theoryof
factor markets, the marginal product of labordetermines the real
wage, and the marginal productof capital determines the rate of
profit.When deficits reduce the capital stock, the marginal
product of labor falls, for each workerhas less capital to work
with. At the same time, the marginal product of capital rises,for
the scarcity of capital makes the marginal unit of capital more
valuable. Thus, to the extent that budget deficits reducethe
capital stock, they lead to lower real wages and higherrates of
profit.
Long—Run Effects of Deficits: Future Taxes
In addition to their effects on macroeconomic performance,
budget deficits have a more direct implicationfor the future: the
resultinggovernment debt may force the government toraise taxes
when the debt comes due.These future taxes reduce hoUsehold
incomes in two ways——directly through the tax paymentsand
indirectly through the deadweight loss that arises astaxes distort
incentives. Alternatively, if taxes do not rise, the government
maybe forced to cut transfer payments or other spendingto free up
11funds to pay the debt.
By how much must taxes rise or spending fall to pay off a
country's debt? This question is more tricky than it seems, for
the answer depends on both policy choices and luck. One surprising
fact is that the government may never need to raise taxes or cut
spending at all. Instead, it can simply roll over its debt: it can
pay off interest and maturing debt by issuing new debt. At first
this policy might appear unsustainable, because the level of debt
increases forever at the rate of interest. Yet as long as the rate
of GDP growth is higher than the interest rate, the ratio of debt
to G' falls over time. With the debt shrinking relative to the
size of the economy, the government can roll over the debt forever
even as its absolute size grows. That is, the economy can grow its
way out of the debt.
History suggests that a government is likely to get away with
running such a Ponzi scheme.In many developed economies, the
average growth rate over long periods has exceeded the average
interest rate on government debt.In the United States, for
example, average growth of nominal GDP from 1871 to 1992 was 5.9
percent, and theaverageinterest rate on debt was 4.0 percent. If
these trends continue, a policy of rolling over the debt (and using
taxesto pay for current government services) will cause the debt
to grow more slowly than GDP.The debt will eventually become
negligible relative to the size of the economy, even with no tax
increases -
Doesthis scenario sound too good to be true? Itmaybe. The
12catch is that the future paths ofinterest rates and GD? are
uncertain. Although interest rates on government debt haveusually
beenlessthan the growth of GDP, these variables fluctuate. Itis
possible, although not especially likely.that theeconomy will
experience a run of bad luck——Say a majordepression——in which the
growth rate drops below the interestrate for a sustained period.
In this case, a policy of rolling over thedebt will cause the debt
torise faster than national income.Eventually, the debt may
become so large relative to the economythat the government has
difficulty selling it, forcing a taxincrease or spending cut.
Moreover, these adjustments are especially painful:they are large,
and they come when the economy is already sufferingfrom a problem
that has caused the debt—income ratio torise.'
Thusa policy of rolling over the debtis a gamble: the
government is likely to avoid any tax increase orspending cut, but
it risks large and painful ones.Faced with this risk, the
governmentmaychoose to reduce the deficit while the debtis still
moderateand the economy is healthy. By raising taxes orcutting
spending initially, the government canreduce the risk of more
difficult fiscal adjustments later.
By how much must the government raisetaxes to ensure that the
debt—income ratio does not explode? One natural,safe policy is to
raise taxes enough to stabilize the real valueof the debt. As
'Ball, zlDaendorf, and Nankiw (1995) use thehistorical behavior
of growth rates and interest rates and estimatetheprobabilityof
this event at 10 to 20 percent, under the assumptionthat thedebt-
incomeratio begins at roughly it current level.
13long as economic growth does not stop entirely, this policy will
ensure that the debt—income ratio falls over time.Thus, a
permanent tax increase equal to the real interest on the debt is an
upper bound on the future tax burden arising from past budget
deficits, assuming the government chooses to play it safe.
II. THE SIZE OP THE EFFECTS
wenowturn from the qualitative effects of budget deficits to
their quantitative importance. Are the effects of deficits on
variables such as GDP and wages large or small? And how important
are these effects compared to other phenomena, such as the
worldwide slowdown in productivity growth? We focus on deficits of
the size experienced in the United States, which has to date
accumulated a debt of about one—half of annual GDP.
A Parable
Aswe have discussed, government debt reduces the growthof
GDP because it crowds out capital. To see how different theU.S.
economywould be ifthere were no debt, consider the following
thoughtexperiment.Suppose that the crowding—out process is
magicallyreversed. One night, thedebtfairy travels around and
replaces every U.S. government bond with a piece of U.S. capital.
Row different would the world be the next morning when everyone
woke up? After answering this question, we argue that it provides
a good guide to the actual effects of deficits in theUnited
States.
14The debt fairy's actions would affect four keyvariables: the
burden of debt service, the level of GD?, the real wage, and the
return to capital. The simplest calculationis the reduction in
thedebtservice.In real terms, the government has to make
interest payments of rID, where D is the debt and ris the real
interest rate.These interest payments must be financed with
taxes,spending cuts, or additional borrowing.In the United
States, the average real return on governmentdebt is approximately
2 percent. Because debt is about half of GD?,the debt fairy's
generosity would eliminate a debt service ofabout 1 percent of
GDP.
The replacement of debt by physical capital would alsoraise
output.Since the capital stock rises by the level of debt D,
output '1 rises by MPKXD, where MPK isthemarginalproduct of
capital.proportionately, output rises by MPKxD/Y. In theUnited
States, the capital share is about 30 percent,and the capital—
income ratio is about 2.5, which implies an IIPK of 12 percent.
Thus, the creation of capital by the debt fairyraises gross
domestic product by about 6 percent.4
neterminingthe effects on realwages and the returns to
capitalrequires some information about the ton of the aggregate
production function.A standard view is that the production
function is roughly cobb-Douglas. For this productionfunction,
1These calculations ignore the tact that themarginalproduct
of capital would fall asthe level of capital rises. Formally,
this means that our numbers are first—order approximationsto the
effects of raising the capital stock.
15the marginal product of labor, which determines the real wage, is
proportional to output per person.Because output rises by 6
percent and the labor force is unchanged, the real wage rises by 6
percent as well. -
Finally,for a Cobb—Douglas production function, the marginal
product of capital is proportional to the output—capital ratio. As
we have discussed, output rises by 6 percent. For a debt—income
ratio of 0.5 and a capital—income ratio of 2.5, the debt fairy's
intervention raises the amount of capital by 20 percent. Thus, the
output—capital ratio falls by about 20 —6=14percent, implying
a similar fall in the return to capital. Because the return to
capital is about 12 percent per year, it falls to about 10.3
percent per year. In the longer run over which real interest rates
are tied to the return to capital, real interest rates also fall by
about 170 basis points.
Is This the RightCalculation?
Ourgoal is to estimate how the U.S. economy would be
different today if the government had always run a balanced budget.
Does the debt-fairy experiment answer this question? The
experiment is exactly right under two assumptions: the economy is
closed, and fiscal policy does not affect the path of net private
saving. With constantsaving,the sale of government debt does not
alterthe level of private wealth. Each dollar of government debt
in savers' portfolios crowds out a dollar of capital, and there is
no inflow of capital from abroad. Fiscal policy simply substitutes
16government debt for capital, and the debt fairy reverses this
process.
Thatifwe relax the obviously false assumption of a closed
economy? In an open economy, capital inflows partly offset the
crowding-out of capital by debt.These inflows mitigate the
effects of debt on GDP, the real wage, and the profit rate. For
example, if one—third of the fall in national saving is financed
with a trade deficit (a typical estimate), the fall in the capital
stock is only two—thirds as large, implying that the impacts on GOP
andfactor prices are only two—thirds as large as estimated above.5
yet, as discussed earlier, this issue is not important for
calculating the effect of deficits on gross national product.
Because GNP rather than GDP determines the living standards of a
country's residents, the impact on living standards is not much
altered by the capital inflow induced by budget deficits.
It is difficult to evaluate the assumption that private saving
is invariant to fiscal policy.As we have discussed, private
saving probably responds somewhat to public saving, and this effect
reduces the impact of budget deficits. Unfortunately, there is no
consensus on the magnitude of the effect. The Council of Economic
Feldstein (1992) suggests that about 25 percent of a budget
deficit is typically financed by a trade deficit, while the Council
of Economic Advisers (1994) suggests 40 percent. At first glance,
the U.S. experience summarized in Table 1 suggests a larger number,
since most of the fall in national saving after 1982 was financed
by a trade deficit. Yet there are probably other factors that
boosted investment and raised the trade deficit over this period.
The fact that the stock market boomed during a period of high real
interest rates suggests increased investor confidence about future
profitability.
17Advisers (1994) argues that the offset is close to zero on the
basis of the experience of the 19805: because private saving was
low in the presence of large budget deficits, it is hard to believe
it would be much lover in the absence of deficits. On the other
hand, studies of countries with deficits of varying sizes suggest
a private—saving offset closer to one half (Bernheim, 1987). In
light of this uncertainty, we view the results of our debt—fairy
experiment as an upper bound on the effects of the U.S. debt on
national income, Our best guess for the actual effect is somewhere
betweenthe debt—fairy figure of 6 percent and half of that level.
Are These Effects a Big Deal?
Do the numbers we have presented suggest that budget deficits
are a major economic problem or a minor one? Our subjective
assessmentis somewhere in between.Our upper bound for the
effects of past U.S.deficitson current national income is 6
percent.One way to interpret this number is to remember that
average real growth in income per capita in the United States is
about 2 percent per year. Thus reducing GNP by 6 percent is like
giving up three years of growth.In the absence of debt, the
United States would have achieved its 1995 level of income in 1992.
These numbers are certainly significant: 6 percent of current GNP
is about $400 billion. But waiting an extra three years to achieve
any level of income is hardly a disaster.
Another way to gauge the importance of deficits is to compare
their effects to those of other economic phenomena. The United
lBStates and most other industrialized nations have experienced slow
growth for the last 20 years, relative to the previous three
decades. This slowdown in growth is behind the widely publicized
stagnation in living standards for many workers and the resulting
public concern that something is wrong with the economy.The
slowdown in output growth has been caused mainly by slower growth
in total factor productivity. Productivity growth has fallen by
about 1 percent per year, resulting today in a total shortfall
relative to the past trend of about 20 percent. By comparison, the
3 to 6 percent fall in income due to government debt can viewed as
only a moderate problem.
III. DEFICITS AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
Having presented a positive analysis of the effects of budget
deficits on aggregate economic variables, we now turn to the
normative questions of whether and why deficits are undesirable.
Popular discussions of deficits usually take it for granted that
deficits are bad for the economy, and perhaps even irimoral.
Although this view can be defended, its justification is less
obvious than one might think.
Economistsare often tempted to use GNP as a shorthand measure
ofeconomic well—being.As we have already discussed, budget
deficits do not affect GNP initially and, in the long run, reduce
GNP.'thus, by the measure of GNP, deficits are unambiguously
harmful. Yet this analysis of deficits is misleading, for economic
well—being depends eli consumption rather than GNP. while deficits
19do not raise GNP, they do raise consumption in the short run by
lowering households' tax burden.
If one focuses on consumption as the proper measure of well-
being, budget deficits come to look like a particular policy of
income redistribution. Redistributions occur because of the change
in the timing of taxes and because of changes in factor prices.
These redistributions do not harm everyone; instead, some people
gain at the expense of others. The gains and losses sum to zero,
so it is not obvious that deficits are good or bad overall.
Who Wins and Who Loses?
Ananalogy may be helpful in thinking about the desirability
ofdeficits, Suppose that Californians become powerful in Congress
and pass a law that reduces taxes in California and raises them in
New York, leaving total taxes unchanged. This law does not benefit
or han the economy as a whole; it merely redistributes income
among people. The direct effect is to benefit Californians and
hurtNewYorkers.There are also likely to be general-equilibrium
effectsonthe incomes of various groups. For example, the shift
in the tax burden from California to New York will raise the demand
for surfboards and reduce the demand for opera, leading to higher
profits for surfboard manufacturers and lower wages for singers.
These effects are called pecuniary externalities. Assuming that
markets are competitive, these pecuniary externalities sum to zero,
like the direct effects of the tax change.
A policy of running deficits is similar to a pro—California
20tax refonu: it shifts taxes between groups. Here theshiftis not
between taxpayersindifferent places but between taxpayers at
differenttimes.When thegovernmentruns a deficit,it
accumulatesdebtthat it must pay backthroughfuture taxation.
Such a policy just shifts the burden of taxes: current taxpayers
gain, and future taxpayers lose.'
-.
Likeany shift in tax burdens, deficits have general-
equilibrium effects. Here the key effects follow from thecrowding
out of capital.The fall in the capital stock affects factor
prices: wages fall, harming workers, and the returns on capital
rise, benefitting capital owners.Like the effects on the
surfboard and opera industries when Californians gain power, the
changes in wages and profit rates are pecuniary externalities. The
losses to workers from lower real wages are balanced by the gains
to the owt,ers of capital from higher rates of profit.
Thus, the winners from budget deficits arecurrenttaxpayers
and future owners of capital, while the losers are future taxpayers
and future workers. Because these gains and losses balance, a
policy of running budget deficits cannot be judged by appealing to
the Pareto criterion or other notions of ecønomic efficiency.
As discussed earlier, it is possiblethata governmentmight
attempt to run a Ponzi scheme by forever rolling over its debt and
accumulating interest. If such a scheme succeeds, then deficits do
not lead to higher future taxes. In this case, a policy of running
deficits can yield a Pareto improvement, for current taxpayers
benefit without any loss to future taxpayers. This possibility,
however,should not be construed as an argument in favor of budget
deficits, f or an attempted Ponzi scheme may fail, in which case the
future tax increases are especially large and painful. For further
discussion of these issues, see Ball, Elmendorf, and Mankiw (1995).
21Instead, the key issue is whether we approve of the direction of
the redistributiOns that this policy implies.
Are the Redistributions Desirable?
Economists are not good at judging redistributions of income.
Indeed, they often claim that this issue is outside of the sphere
of economics altogether. It is, therefore, somewhat surprising
that economists decry budget deficits with such consensus and
assurance.
One widely accepted standard for judging redistributions is
the ability—to—pay principle: redistributions of income are
desirable if they go from better—off to worse—off people. By this
criterion, the redistributions arising from changes in factor
prices are undesirable. Many people hold little wealth and consume
the income from their wages, while a small part of society holds
most of the economy's wealth. When crowding—out raises the returns
on capital and reduces wages, the wealthy gain at the expense of
the less wealthy.
Yet, from the standpoint of the ability—to—pay principle, the
direct effect of budget deficits——the change in the timing of
taxes——is harder to reconcile with the conventional view that
deficits are undesirable. Because of technological progress, the
income and consumption of a typical individual in the economy rises
over time. Because budget deficits shift taxes forward in time,
theybenefitrelatively poor current taxpayers at the expense of
relatively rich future taxpayers. If reducing inequality is a goal
22of policy, shouldn't budget deficits be applauded?
One way to answer this question is to go beyond neoclassical
economic theory.Although standard models assume that people
desire to smooth consumption evenly over time, popular discussions
of economic policy presume that consumption should rise over time.
Politiciansoften assume a moral imperative that the current
generation sacrifice to ensure that future generations enjoy a
substantially higher standard ofliving.This view suggests that
itis undesirable to shift a tax burden onto our children, even
though our children will be better able to shoulder thatburden
than we are.
Another possible answer is that levels of taxation should be
based on the benefits principle, which holds that people should pay
for the government benefits that they receive. For example,the
useof a gasoline tax to pay for road repair is not based on the
abilities to pay of drivers and non—drivers; instead, it is
justified on the ground that drivers should pay forroads because
they benefit from them,Similarly, one might argue that each
generation should pay for the government it providesitself,
regardless of its level of income.
These issues are not easily resolved. Yet one point is clear:
saying whether and why deficits are undesirable requires judgeaents
that are more philosophical than economic.
Should You Worry About Deficits?
A related question is whether an individual needs to rely on
23politicians to avoid the future suffering caused by budget
deficits, suppose you are worried about the effects of deficits on
your children, and aren't confident that Bill Clinton and Newt
Gingrich will take care of the problem by balancing the budget.
You can eliminate your worries simply by saving and leaving a
larger bequest to your children, so that they can bear the burden
of future taxes without reducing their consumption.
Some economists——advocates of Ricardian equivalence——claim
that people do in fact behave this way. If this were true, private
behavior would fully offset the effects of public dissaving.
Although we doubt that most people are so far—sighted, some people
probably do act this way, and anyone could. Deficits give you the
chance to consume more at the expense of your children, but they do
not require it.'
Indeed, if you are forward—looking and care about your
children, deficits can benefit your family.You can insulate
yourself from the effects of tax shifting through a larger bequest.
And, since you are accumulating more capital than the typical
family, you and your children are among the winners from deficit—
induced changes in factor prices. That is, you benefit from the
higher rates of return that deficits cause.
sowhy should you the reader——a person who we assume both
loves his childrenand understands the effects of deficits——worry
aboutbalancing the budget? Once again, answering this question
requires going beyond standard economic theory.One possible
Herschel Grossman (1995) makes a similar argument.
24answer is paternalism. You can protect your children from
deficits, but you know that some irresponsible parents will exploit
their children to raise their own consumption. You may care about
protecting these children's standard of living even thoughtheir
ownparentsdo not.
Alternatively, there may be externalities from the effects of
deficits that do not appear in standard economic models.Paul
Romer (1987) and, more recently, Bradford Detongand Lawrence
summers (1991) have suggested that the accumulation of capital
stimulates technological change and increases economy—wide
productivity.If so, then the crowding—out caused by deficits
depresses national income by more than ourcalculations above
suggest. In addition, no single family can insulateitself from
these effects through higher private saving.
Another possible externality may arise from the distribution
of income. As discussed earlier, deficits redistribute income from
wage—earners to capital owners, creating greaterdispersion in
wealth and income. Perhaps widening inequality is undesirable even
for the rich. A large poor population might raise crime ratesand
otherwise threaten the living standards of the wealthy. The fact
that most people——both rich and poor—-prefer to live inrich
communities suggests that people care about their neighbors' living
standards for not entirely altruistic reasons.
A related consideration is that people often care aboutthe
incomes of their fellow citizens relative to citizens of other
countries.If large deficits reduce the U.S. growth rate, the
25average American standard of living may fall behind that in Japan.
It is not obvious why this matters——why we do not care just about
our own standard of living. Perhaps a nation's relative income
matters because it affects some sense of national prestige.
Perhaps it matters because it affects national power in world
politics.Again, judging the desirability of deficits leads to
questions that economists are not particularly qualified to
address.
IV. AHARD LANDING?
Numerical results suggest that the effects of budget deficits
are moderate in size. Moreover, since there are winners as well as
losers, it is not obvious that deficits are undesirable overall.
These conclusions suggest that popular concerns about budget
deficits are overblown, at least when the national debt is at its
current U.S. level relative to national income.
Matters start looking more serious if one looks ahead to
future fiscal policy. There are reasons to worry that debt—income
ratios are headed upwards around the world.Many countries,
including the United States, project large deficits because of
growing expenditures on programs for the elderly, such as Social
Security and Medicare.According to some projections, under
current programs, the U.S. debt—income ratio will reach five in
2025! Of course, the future is uncertain: we may be saved from
rising debt—income ratios by fiscal tightening or by good luck such
as high growth in income or containment of medical costs. But what
26if the debt—income ratio does keep rising?
Part of the answer is clear:theeffects we have already
discussedare magnified. Wehave calculatedthatpastU.S.
deficits——whichhave produceda current debt—income ratio of about
one—half—-redUce current gross national productby3to6 percent.
Ifthe ratio risestoone, the effect will rise to6 to 12 percent.
Yet,if the debt—income ratio continues torise, there may
alsobe additional effects which are qualitatively differentfrom
those the economy is now experiencing. In particular, arising
debt—income ratio in a country may at some point lead to a sharp
decrease in demand for the country's assets arising from afall in
investor confidence. In this section, we discuss howsuch a "hard
landing" night come about and the possible effects onthe economy.
our discussion is necessarily speculative. As far as weknow, no
major industrialized country has ever experienced ahard landing of
the sort we will describe. But keep in mind: no major
industrialized country has persistently run large budgetdeficits
in peacetime——until recently.'
Howa Hard Landing Might Occur
Whymightthedemandfora country's assets fall? There are
two distinct butcomplementary stories about how a rising national
debt could lead to lower demand for domestic assets.
The first story emphasizes the effect ofdeficits on a
Here we draw on previous discussions of hardlandings by
Icrugman (1991, 1992) and Summers (1991).
27country's net—foreign—asset position. As we have discussed, budget
deficits tend to produce trade deficits, which a country finances
by selling assets abroad. Yet there may be limits to the quantity
of domestic assets foreigners are willing to hold. For various
reasons (such as lack of information, exchange—rate risk, or sheer
xenophobia), international diversification is far from perfect.
This fact is consistent with the finding of Feldstein and Horioka
(1980) that a country's saving roughly balances its investment over
long periods. As a country's net—foreign—asset position
deteriorates, foreign investors may become less and less willing to
purchase additional domestic assets.
A second story is that a rising level of government debt makes
investors fear government default or a similar policy aimed at
holders of domestic assets. Unlike the first story, this story is
relevant even if a country has not reached a negative net—foreign
asset position. And in this story, domestic as well as foreign
investors flee domestic assets.
In speculating about a loss of investor confidence, one is
naturally led to draw on the experience of the debt crisis in less
developed countries during the 1980s.(The case of Mexico in 1994
is less relevant, because it involves imprudent monetary and
exchange—rate policy as well as debt.)In the LDC debt crisis,
capital inflows in the f on of bank loans dried up when countries
began having trouble servicing their debts, leading to fears of
widespread default. It is tempting to imagine that this experience
is not relevant to countries like the United States——that rich
28countries would never default. But Orange County, California is
even richer than the United States, and it is about to default on
its debt. Orange County voters, turning down a tax increase needed
to honor the debt, appear to reject the idea that they should pay
for their government's mistakes.It is easy to imagine such
arguments at the national level——or at least a fear on the part of
investors that such arguments will arise.
There is, however, a reason that the IJDC debt crisis is an
imperfect guide to hard landings in the United States or European
countries. The Latin American debt was external: it was owed to
foreigners.Thus the direct effect of default was a loss to
foreigners, making default a relatively attractive way out of a
fiscal crisis. The same is true for Orange County: most of its
debt was owned outside of the county. In the United States, by
contrast, most of the national debt is owned by American citizens.
Since an internal debt makes default less tempting, it is
likely to delay a hard landing: it takes a higher level of debt to
spook investors. The fact that a debt is internal also affectsthe
nature of the prospective policies that might spark a hard landing.
If the debt—income ratio spins out of control, something must be
done or default is unavoidable. And it might remain impossible
politically to raise income taxes sufficiently.One possible
outcome is a general tax on wealth. The government might require
owners of its bonds to "share in the sacrifice" through partial
default, but itwouldalso tax the holders of other assets. The
taxcould extend to foreign owners of domestic assets to reduce the
29burden on domestic citizens.
An unsustainable path of debt and a worsening net foreign
asset position could lead investors to fear other unpleasant
consequences as wall. Extensive foreign ownership of u.s. assets
could lead to restrictions on capital outflows. Perhaps as debt
grows and wages fall relative to those of other countries,
political outrage will produce a government that increases
interference in the economy. Many U.S. politicians, for example,
are tempted to blame domestic problems on Japanese trade practices;
a trade war is not an unthinkable result of a general decline in
living standards. Similarly, many less developed countries have
unhappy histories in which economic problems create political
pressures for policies that discourage investment and make the
problems even worse. Fear of these outcomes——or just a belief that
something bad must happen if debt continues to grow——could lead to
a fall in the demand for domestic assets.
In principle, the decrease in demand for domestic assets could
be gradual, with the assets slowly becoming less popular as the
fiscal situation deteriorates. The history of financial markets
suggests, however, that shifts in investor confidence can be
sudden, with the timing driven by self-fulfilling expectations. A
flight from domestic assets could occur at a seemingly arbitrary
point in time, much as the 1987 stock market crash did. Or a hard
landing could be triggered by adverse events.In the Latin
American case, the worldwide recession of the early 1980s caused
investors to revise downward their expectations of growth and,
30hence, the likelihood of repayment. similarly, a crisis in the
United States might be triggered by bad news about income growth,
which would imply higher debt—income ratios for given fiscal
policies.
since a hard landing involves the psychology of markets, it is
hard to judge when it might occur.The debt crisis hit Latin
jnerican countries with debt—income ratios below the current U.S.
level of one halt, but these countries had external debts and hence
a greater temptation to default. In addition, interest rates were
much higher for the Latin debt than for the U.S. debt, so the path
of debt was potentially more explosive. High debt—income ratios in
developed countries have previously occurred only in wartime, when
they were clearly temporary. Recent peacetime increases in the
ratio are taking the United States and other countries into
uncharted territory, so it is impossible to say whether a hard
landing is around the corner or still far off.
The Costs of a Hard Landina
If confidence in a country's assets collapses, what happens to
the economy?Theory and the experiences of LDCs gives some guide
as tothe effects. The decline in the demand for domestic assets
leads to a sharp fall in the prices of these assets, including a
fall in the stock market. Interest rates and other asset yields
rise. The value of the domestic currency falls as investors sell
thecurrency they acquire from selling domestic assets. As the
currency depreciates, the trade balance turns sharply toward
31surplus, and capital flows out of the country.
Such a hard landing potentially hans an economy in many ways.
Most obviously, wealth falls because of the decline in asset
prices. The lack of investor confidence and higher interest rates
lead to lower levels of physical investment1 and eventually a lower
capital stock. This effect exacerbates the decline in real wages
caused by budget deficits.
A number of other consequences might follow as well. Indeed,
hard landings are hard to think about because things can go wrong
in such a rich variety of ways. First, the rise in interest rates
during a hard landing would likely exacerbate the fiscal crisis by
causing the debt to grow rapidly. To avoid a greater disaster, the
government would have to shift abruptly to primary budget
surpluses, causing a sharp fall in consumption. That is, high
interest rates would eliminate the possibility of growing out of a
debt or paying it off slowly.
Second, the Latin American experience suggests that the shift
in the trade balance towards surplus would be a major sectoral
shock. The debt—crisis countries experienced a large shift from
non—tradeables to tradeables, causing high unemployment in non—
tradeables.According to some observers, the sectoral shock
brought growth to a standstill for a decade. (Sachs and tarrain,
1993)
Third, the hard landing could lead to inflation through two
distinct channels.The drop in the domestic currency would
directly push up the prices of iriports, which could trigger
32continuing inflation if monetary policy is accommodative. And, in
response to the fiscal crisis, the monetary authority may feel
increased pressure to raise revenue through money creation. Both
these effects were important in producing high inflation in Latin
Americaafter the debt crisis. We can hope that thecentral banks
ofdeveloped countries would hold theline against inflation even
inacrisis. But if the crisisbrings extremists to power, who
knows?
Finally,a hard landing could trigger a general financial
crisis.Declines in asset prices and increases in fins' interest
burdenswould increase bankruptcies. Bankruptcies of firms could
trigger financial distress forthebanksthat lendto then. In the
worstcase, these problems and the resulting contraction ofcredit
would build on each other and financial intermediationwould break
down. As in the 1930s,the economy could plunge into a Depression.
A Call forPrudence
Previoussections of this paper have described well—understood
andquantifiable effects of budget deficits, such as crowding—out
of capital and intertemporal shifts in tax burdens. By contrast,
this section has been highly speculative. We can only guess what
level of debt will trigger a shift in investor confidence, and
about the nature and severity of the effects.Despite the
vagueness of fears about hard landings, these fears maybe the most
important reason for seeking to reduce budget deficits.If the
main effects of deficits are moderate redistributions across
33generations and groups of people, perhaps they should not be a
central concern of policyrnakers. But as countries increase their
debt, they wander into unfamiliar territory in which hard landings
may lurk.If policyrnakers are prudent, they will not take the
chance of learning what hard landings in G7 countries are really
like.
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